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Rehab or Relocation? 
Estimating the Demand for Cocaine through an American Port City Analysis 
 
Gustave A. Bartuska 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past five decades American drug policy can succinctly be 
classified by two words: expensive and punitive. American drug policy makers 
have conducted the “war on drugs” largely through supply side intervention. As 
the theory goes, by attacking drug producers, drug prices will rise due to the 
increased risk faced by suppliers, this risk will in turn be passed along to 
consumers in the form of higher prices. In order to critically asses the merits of 
such an expensive antidrug policy it is essential to estimate the price elasticity of 
demand for drugs.  
The main finding of this paper is that cocaine users are extremely price 
inelastic and that a doubling of cocaine prices will result in approximately a five 
percent drop in cocaine usage. Further, policy analysis reveals that the theory 
driving supply side intervention is fundamentally flawed. Over the past thirty 
years, as antidrug spending has increased fivefold, drug prices have declined be 
nearly eighty percent – bolstering a conclusion that American policy makers need 
to rethink the “war on drugs”.  
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Introduction 
 
Illicit drugs impose significant costs on society and on individual uses. 
These costs include increased crime, health problems, and employment. Because 
of these costs, both the federal government and the state governments have made 
drug controls an important budget priority. Traditionally, American drug control 
policy has been focused on supply side intervention. In theory, with interdiction 
efforts focused on suppliers, the cost (i.e. the risk) of producing drugs will 
increase, a cost that will then be passed along to the final consumers. This 
increase in the retail drug prices should then in turn cause usage to drop.  
According to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
in 1995, spending on the “war on drugs” was approximately $30-35 billion 
between the federal, state, and local government. This figure represents a fivefold 
increase from the previous decades spending of $6-7 billion (ONDCP 1997). With 
drug control being such a significant factor of government spending, it becomes 
crucial for researchers to determine the efficacy of current drug policies and asses 
the validity of such large government expenses. One possible way of evaluating 
these policies is to measure the price elasticity of demand for cocaine. This 
estimate will allow researchers and policy makers to estimate the effects that an 
increase in drug prices will have on drug consumption.  
 
A Brief History of Cocaine (- 1970s)  
 
Cocaine is a powerful drug that is derived from the leaves of the coca 
shrub. The coca leaf originated in the Andes Mountains and is now grown 
primarily in the South American countries of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Coca 
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leaves have been chewed almost universally by some indigenous communities, 
and in fact, archeologists have found coca leaves in Peruvian grave sites dating 
from approximately 500 AD (Redda, Walker, and Barnett 1989). Further, the 
Indians who lived in the mountains of the Andean region chewed the coca leaves 
for thousands of years as a way to diminish hunger, lessen fatigue, and gain 
endurance for work – cocaine is both a stimulant of the central nervous system 
and an anorexigenic (Redda, Walker, and Barnett 1989). 
Cocaine was first extracted from coca leaves in Germany in 1855 by the 
chemist Friedriche Gaedecke (Weiss 1994). For years later, Albert Niemann 
described a step-by-step purification process and named the new compound 
“cocaine” – an accomplishment that earned him his PhD from Gottingen 
University in 1859 (Weiss 1994). However, the discovery remained static, and it 
wasn’t until the mid 1880’s when the production of purified cocaine gained 
momentum. The powder began to be used in the practice of medicine, most 
notably in ophthalmology as a local anesthetic and pain killer, as well as by 
various militaries to enhance the endurance of foot soldiers. The drug became 
somewhat of a fad over the next several years and was integrated into popular 
consumer products such as tonics and chewing gums and was an active ingredient 
in (what was a new drink at the time) coca-cola –products that were reported to be 
enjoyed by such notable figures as Queen Victoria, Winston Churchill, and the 
fictitious Sherlock Holmes (Streatfeild 2003). Even the popular Austrian 
neurologist and psychiatrist, Sigmund Freud, extolled the drug and wrote several 
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enthusiastic papers centered on it. Most notably, in Über Coca (On Coca 1884), 
Freud wrote, 
 
"...exhilaration and lasting euphoria, which in no way differs from the 
normal euphoria of the healthy person...You perceive an increase of self-
control and possess more vitality and capacity for work.... This result is 
enjoyed without any of the unpleasant after-effects that follow exhilaration 
brought about by alcohol....Absolutely no craving for the further use of 
cocaine appears after the first, or even after repeated taking of the drug..." 
 
By the turn of the century, the addictive and malicious properties of 
cocaine began to elucidate themselves as part of the racial backdrop of the time 
period. In 1914, Dr. Christopher Koch of the Pennsylvania State Pharmacy Board 
asserted that the majority of attacks upon white women in the south were a direct 
result of a ‘cocaine crazed Negro brain’ (Redda, Walker, and Barnett 1989). Dr. 
Koch’s comments metastasized and even great public hysteria over cocaine and 
precipitated a string of newspaper articles focusing on the epidemic of cocaine use 
among African Americans in the South. Growing concern by the American public 
materialized later that year when the U.S. congress passed, and President 
Woodrow Wilson signed, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. The acts required all 
those handling the drug to be registered with the government, pay special taxes, 
and keep records on each sale – measures which effectively made cocaine (as well 
as marijuana and heroin) illegal nationwide (Weiss 1994).  
In response to the sanctions, cocaine use went underground and was 
largely confined to so-called bohemians (such as jazz musicians, actors, and 
artists) and affluent members of certain minorities (Platt 2000). Moreover, by the 
1930s amphetamines were seen as a cheaper and longer lasting legal substitute for 
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the now very expensive illegal cocaine. Cocaine was even being curtailed in the 
medical community thanks to the dawn of newer and longer-lasting anesthetics. 
By 1950, the United States government was claiming success in the war on 
recreational drugs, at least with regard to cocaine - yet the celebration was 
premature (Platt 2000).  
The 1960s in United States stands in stark comparison to the previous 
decade in which the county enjoyed a steady uprising in the economy, education, 
entertainment, and civil rights. The so-called psychedelic revolution began in the 
1960s and ushered in a new class of Americans best remembered for their 
licentious attitudes and new found interest in drug use, particularly cocaine – Paul 
Kantner, guitar player for the psychedelic rock band Jefferson Airplane, quipped, 
"If you can remember anything about the sixties, you weren't really there."  
Cocaine was dubbed “the champagne of drugs” for its preference of choice 
among the rich and famous, and its use was on the rise all across America. In 
1972 one in eleven eighteen- to twenty-five-year-old Americans had used cocaine 
(Mieczkowski 1996). Ten years later that figure was up to one in four, and by 
1982 the National Institute on Drug Abuse reported that approximately 22 million 
Americans had used cocaine at least once - the figure stood at 5 million in 1974 
(Mieczkowski 1996).  
The following two graphs exhibit the remarkable upward trend in annual 
and monthly cocaine use carried over from the 1960s into the following decades. 
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Figure 1 - Past Year Cocaine Use among Persons Aged 12 or Older, by Age: 
1972-2004 
 
Source: NSDUH 2005 
Figure 2 - Past Month Cocaine Use among Persons Aged 18 to 25: 1971-2004 
 
Source: NSDUH 2005 
 
Overview of the American Drug Policy and its Effects (1980s-) 
 
United States drug policies are readily characterized for their both punitive 
and extremely expensive nature. In direct monetary costs, according to the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy, the federal government spends approximately 
$15 billion annually on drug control in the mid 1990s - state and local 
governments also spend at least this amount (ONDCP 2004). Thus, drug control 
was a $30-35 billion government program in the 1990s, a sharp increase from 
about $6-7 billion in 1985 (ONDCP 2004). According to the ONDCP (2004), 
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federal spending on drug control policies has an annual growth rate of over 14 
percent for the years 1981 to 1999.  
The punitive nature of drug policy in the United States is clearly reflected 
in budget spending and incarceration trends. About three-quarters of the national 
drug control budget is spent on apprehending and punishing predominately drug 
suppliers – leaving treatment options with only one-sixth of the budget (ONDCP 
2004). In 1980, there were about 31,000 people serving jail or prison time for 
selling or using drugs, by 1994 the figure had jumped to near 400,000 (Sevigny 
and Caulkins 2004). Between 1990 and 2000 drug incarcerations increased by still 
another 200,000, and have since reached the half-million mark (Sevigny and 
Caulkins 2004). In summary, it is estimated that supply-oriented enforcement has 
increased so that the risk of incarceration, given participation in drug selling, has 
tripled from 1980 to 2000 (i.e. risk of incarceration has increased, not just the 
number, in absolute term, or drug imprisonments) – while at the same time 
cocaine prices have dropped by about 80% from 1980 to 2000 (Caulkins and 
Reuter 1998; ONDCP 2004; MacCoun and Reuter 2001; Caulkins and Chandler 
2005). 
The vast mast majority of incarcerations stem for the enforcement of 
people involved in drug distribution, not those who merely use (Sevigny and 
Caulkins 2004). However, the number of individuals who are imprisoned for drug 
possession felonies only (non intent to distribute) has significantly increased – in 
1992 alone, 50,000 were sentenced to state prison for non-distribution offenses 
(Sevigny and Caulkins 2004). An infamous example of the penal nature of U.S. 
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drug policy is that in federal courts the possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine 
will generate a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, compared with a national 
average time served for homicide of about five years and four months, even 
though that $400 worth of crack is just one fifty-millionth of U.S. annual cocaine 
consumption, or about two weeks’ supply for one regular user (Sevigny and 
Caulkins 2004). The following table summarizes some of the characteristics in 
incarceration trends through 1994.  
Table 1: Trends in Drug Enforcement, 1980-1994 
 
Source: Sevigny and Caulkins, 2004 
 
The justification for aggressive punishment is the claim that high rates of 
incarceration will reduce drug use and related problems. The theory is that tough 
enforcement and sever convictions will raise the risk of drug selling, reinforce the 
message that drugs are disapproved of and harmful, and also make drug dealers 
more vigilant and thus make it harder for customers to find them. Some dealers 
will then drop out of the business, and the remainder will require higher 
compensation for taking on greater risks. Hence, the price of drugs should rise 
which in turn will discourage the consumption of illegal drugs, as with licit goods 
and services. The following figure shows that this is clearly not the case 
(measuring punishment by “Drug Inmates”). 
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Figure 3 - Cocaine Price vs. Drug Inmate Population 
 
Source: Caulkins, Reuter, Taylor (2006) 
 
Yet despite the sharply increased stringency, prices have been in steady 
decline. During the past 25 years, the general price trends have gone more or less 
in the opposite direction from what would be expected (see figure above). 
Incarceration for drug law violations (primarily pertaining to cocaine and heroin) 
increased 11-fold between 1980 and 2002; yet purity-adjusted powder cocaine 
prices have declined by roughly 80 percent since 1981 (Caulkins, Reuter, and 
Taylor 2006). A very sharp (roughly 70 percent) declines during the 1980s 
through 1989 at all quantity levels, a pronounced (22 to 35 percent) one-year 
increase from 1989 to 1990, and gradual declines during the 1990s so that prices 
at the end of the 1990s were 30 to 40 percent below those in 1989 (Caulkins, 
Reuter, and Taylor 2006). With the additional data for 2000 forward, the series 
show an apparent price jump between 1999 and 2000 that was sustained until 
2001, at least at the lowest quantity level. Prices continued to decline uniformly, 
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however, from 2001 to 2003, reaching all-time lows roughly 12 to 21 percent 
below those in 1999 (Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006). 
 Further, it is important to stress that another implication of a punitive drug 
policy is to lower availability to current and potential users. However, long-term 
data from an annual survey of high school seniors (Monitoring the Future) 
suggests that this goal has not been achieved. The fraction of high-school seniors 
reporting that cocaine is available or readily available has been about 50% for 25 
years – it is notable that this average includes a range that started at 30 percent in 
1980 and, while somewhat noisy, has continued to drifted upward (Caulkins, 
Reuter, and Taylor 2006). 
 
The Cocaine Production Process 
 
 The primary raw material for manufacturing cocaine (cocaine 
hydrochloride) is the coca leaf, and the two intermediate products are coca paste 
and coca base. The first step in the process is harvesting coca leaves, which can be 
done tow to six times per year – the cultivation process, seed to leaf, generally 
takes 12 to 24 months (Dombey-Moore, Resetar, and Childress 1994). Then the 
leaves must be dried, which can take about half a day give sufficient sun. These 
dried leaves can then be stored for extended periods of time without losing much 
of their alkaloid content (a naturally occurring nitrogen compounds). The next 
step is to turn the leaves into paste – a process that is not overly complex, and 
within the supply chain is generally carried out by peasants in small factories. 
Once the paste is produced, the next step is to refine it into base; this is the more 
sophisticated process. According to the Defense Science Board, this step requires 
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1 “chemist” and 50 laborers to produce 500 kilos of base per week (Dombey-
Moore, Resetar, and Childress 1994). The final stage is to render the base into 
cocaine HCL (the normal form of transport and use); a process which is also 
relatively complicated and requires several chemicals.  
Table 2 - Cocaine Hydrochloride Production 
 
Source: Dombey-Moore, Resetar, Childress (1994) 
 
 
Outline of the Factors Contributing to Cocaine Price 
  
 Perhaps the most striking observation about cocaine prices is simply that 
they are extraordinarily high per unit weight. For example, in the late 1990s, gold 
sold for around 300 per ounce where as cocaine retailed at $100 per pure gram, 
and hence can cost upwards of $2834.95 per pure ounce (gold price quoted at 
www.goldprice.org). This astonishingly high price for cocaine will now be 
disentangled into its respective percentage costs. 
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 First, the cost of producing cocaine (raw material costs) is very low. The 
DEA (1990) lists source prices of cocaine in Columbia at $800 to $1600 per 
kilogram -- this means that the whole sale price of cocaine in Columbia is only 
about 1% of U.S. retail prices. This percentage is comparable to many consumer 
goods. However other than raw material costs, the nature of costs is rather 
disparate.  
For cocaine, like all illicit drugs, no taxes are paid. Conventional shipping 
costs of cocaine are negligible. For example, FedEX will ship a 1 kilogram 
package from Bogota, Columbia to New York City (zip code 10001) for $54.81, 
which is about 0.02% of the kilogram price of cocaine in New York City (price 
quote obtained from fedex.com, March 15, 2008). The packaging materials 
account for perhaps 0.25% to 0.5% of the retail price – dealers report paying 
about $2.50 for 100 glassine bags used for retail costs (Caulkins et al. n.d.). 
Promotional costs are also negligible because, other than stamping bags with 
distinctive logos, very little marketing is done (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). 
Overhead for shelf space is almost nothing, even when drug dealers operate out of 
buildings, because the buildings are often abandoned and, in any case, the drugs 
are not bulky. According to Caulkins and Reuter (1998), inventory costs, 
assuming a 3 month supply (probably only characteristic at the upper levels) and a 
25% interest rate (reflecting high risk), would only be on the order of 1% of retail 
sales. Processing costs are also very low in source countries. In transcripts of 
interviews with crack sellers, Caulkins et al. (n.d.) note that a “cooker” was paid 
 
12 
 
$100 to cook up 1.25 ounces of cocaine that sold at retail for $6500, suggesting 
conversion costs of 1.5% of retail sales.   
The costs enumerate above provide little insight into the realized cost for 
cocaine. Instead, for cocaine, the dominate costs appear to be associated with 
importing, labor, product and asset seizures, and compensation for the risks of 
incarceration and physical harm.  
Cocaine costs around $15,000 per kilogram at import, with in the U.S. 
borders – an increase of about $1,500 per kilogram in Colombia (Caulkins and 
Reuter 1998). However, cocaine sells for about $110 per gram (adjusted for 
purity), which is equivalent to $110,000 per kilogram. Hence, about 12% 
($13,500/$110,000) of the retail value is attributed to import costs (Caulkins and 
Reuter 1998).  
Labor costs are very high, with respect to comparable consumer goods, 
because illegality forces the distribution system to operate in inefficient ways. For 
example, cocaine is packaged by hand. Simple machines could do the work at a 
small fraction of the cost (like they do in the case of sugar or flour); however 
enforcement makes it very risky to maintain fixed capital equipment. Reuter et al. 
(1990) estimate that in 1988 a daily cocaine retailer sold a median of $3,600 worth 
of drugs each month. These same individuals were estimated to have spent 66 
hours per month selling; to earn a median of $7 per hour when working in the licit 
labor market; and thus to have foregone something like 66 hours times $7 per 
hour = $462 in legitimate earnings per $3,600 sold (Reuter et al. 1990). Hence, 
one could view about $462/$3,600 = 13% of the retail value of the cocaine market 
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as compensation for retailers' time. Including costs of labor at higher levels and--
to the extent that they are excluded from the Reuter et al. (1996) study--support 
workers (touters, holders, baggers, look-outs, etc.) would no doubt increase this 
proportion. 
The Federal-wide Drug Seizure System (FDSS) recorded 98 metric tons of 
cocaine seizures within the Unites States in 1995 (ONDCP 1997). Valued at 
wholesale prices of $20,000 to $25,000 per kilogram, this represents a loss to 
traffickers of $1.96 to 2.45 billion, which is 5% to 6% of the $38 billion in retail 
cocaine sales (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). About $800 million worth of non-drug 
assets are forfeited to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (USDEA), Organized 
Drug Enforcement Task Forces, and U.S. Customs each year, which represents 
about 1.3% of the roughly $60 billion per year market for all illicit drags (Rhodes 
et al. 1997). Godshaw, Koppel, and Pancoast (1987) estimated that state and local 
agency seizures were about half as large as federal seizures – suggesting that state 
and local seizures probably account for at least another 1% to 3.5% of retail sales.  
Therefore, estimates suggest that seizures at all levels of government represent 
about 8% to 11% of retail cocaine price.  
Finally, risk compensation, for both prison time and physical danger, 
accounts for a little over 50% of the cost of cocaine. According to Maguire and 
Pastore (1997), in 1994, drug law violators were sentenced to terms that lead to 
approximately 325,000 person years of incarceration, with the vast majority being 
associated with drug trafficking. Further, Kleiman (1992) reports on average, a 
drug dealer requires an average compensation of $43,500 per expected year on 
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incarceration. Thus, the risk compensation associate with prison time would 
represent $14.14 billion ($43,500 x 325,000), or about 23.6% of the $60 billion 
market for illicit drugs.  
Reuter et al. (1990) estimate that per year of retail drug selling in 
Washington, D.C., compensation for the risk of death ($10,500) and injury 
($2,100) together were about 1.4 times greater than that for the risk of 
incarceration ($9,000). If this same ratio applied nationwide, this suggests that 1.4 
times 23.6%, or 33%, of the retail value of drug sales represents compensation for 
the risk of injury or death (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). It is important to note that 
this national percentage may be lower because Washington D.C. in 1988 saw a 
homicide rate that was near the top among U.S. cities and the share attributed to 
drug trafficking by the local police department was very high – thus it may have 
been a time period that was unusually violent for drug dealers (Caulkins and 
Reuter 1998). Further, the late 1980s was also a time period when cocaine markets 
were still developing, which may have generated very high rates of competitive 
and transactional violence for dealers (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). 
Table 3 - Estimate of Magnitude of Cost Components for Cocaine Sold at 
Retail, 1990 
Wholesale price in Columbia 1% 
Importing of drug 12% 
Retail Labor 13% 
High-level labor 1-3% 
Drug and asset seizures 8-11% 
Money laundering fees 2-4% 
Packaging, processing, and inventory 
costs 
1-2% 
Compensation for risk of prison 24% 
Compensation for physical risk 33% 
Total ~100% 
Source: Caulkins and Reuter (1998) 
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Variation in Cocaine Prices: Market Level Variation 
 
 Despite their high costs, cocaine prices are also exhibit I wide range of 
variation that sets them distinctly apart from other consumer goods. Cocaine 
prices vary across market levels, between locations, over time, and from 
transaction to transaction.  
 Caulkins and Padman (1993) offer the simple explanation that variation 
across market levels exists because there is substantial quantity discounts for the 
drug – this is the simple concept where as the purchaser received a discount, per 
unit, when he buys in higher volume. Caulkins (1997b) estimates that between the 
import of a 250 kilogram import of cocaine, and the final street sale of 0.2 grams, 
there may be five of six separate sales transactions. This high number of steps 
between the producer and the end user, while highly inefficient, supports a 
quantity discount. Hence, as one moves down through the distribution hierarchy, 
transaction sizes get smaller and the price per unit gets larger in a manner that is 
well described by a power relation. 
 Specifically, a simple model of the domestic distribution network is that a 
mid-level dealer buys a quantity of drug, repackages the drugs into φ equal size 
units, and sells them at some multiple, δ, of the original price (Caulkins and 
Padman 1993). Further, Caulkins and Padman (1993) argue that if the branching 
factor φ (which is understood as the number of children of each node) and the 
price multiplier δ are the same at every level of the network, then this implies that 
the price P as a function of transaction size Q satisfies the following relation:  
φP(Q/φ) = δP(Q)                                                    (1) 
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This implies that, 
 
P(Q) = αQ^(1-lnδ/lnφ)                                           (2) 
 
Therefore, it is apparent that the price per unit is proportional to the transaction 
size raised to a (negative) power. Caulkins and Padman (1993) test this model 
empirically and find the log-linear quantity discount model (stated above as the 
implied form) fits cocaine price data 1981-1994 well.  
 Quantity discounts are a very familiar concept in the market for consumer 
goods, however the discounts (or inversely the mark-ups) for illicit drugs is 
significantly larger (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). Section III discussed how 
American drug policy is incredibly punitive and predominately targets suppliers, 
in light of quantity discounts, there are important implications on America’s drug 
war strategy. If most of the drug seizures are occurring at the higher levels (points 
relatively close to the supplier) than the cost of replacing those drugs is much less 
than the cost of replacing an equivalent amount at the retail level, because they 
have not been subjected to the high mark-up costs yet.  
Another important question that arises from the variation of cocaine prices 
across market levels is how enforcement targeted at the higher levels, to raise 
prices, is transmitted to a change in price at the lower levels. Caulkins and Reuter 
(1998) present two models for understanding how price changes are realized 
through the distribution chain. First, the “additive model” suggests that increasing 
high-level prices by $1 per gram will increase the retail price by approximately $1 
per gram. This model assumes that at each level the market is competitive and that 
additional $1 cost is simply carried through the distribution chain. The 
“multiplicative model” however suggests that increasing the high level prices by 
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1% will increase the retail price by 1% (Caulkins and Reuter 1998; Caulkins 
1994a).  
In regards to market level variations, these two models have significantly 
different implications for the efficacy of interdiction and enforcement at the high 
levels. For example, let cocaine have an initial import price of X and a retail price 
of 10X. Then consider a government program that increased the import price from 
X to 2X. Under the additive model, the retail price would only rise modestly to 
11X. Whereas, under the multiplicative model, because import prices doubles, 
retail price will double from 10X to 20X. Clearly the multiplicative model is 
desirable when attempting to raise retail prices in an attempt to curb drug 
consumption. Caulkins (1990, 1994a) and Boyum (1992), by analyzing historic 
price data, find some support for the multiplicative model at certain stages in the 
distribution chain, however because the data is very imprecise they concede that 
conclusions cannot be accurately drawn.   
In summary, it has been observed that the market for cocaine exhibits a 
substantial degree of discounting for larger quantities (or inversely, substantial 
mark-ups for smaller quantities). However, because price data is imprecise and 
missing for many of the steps in the distribution chain, it is not currently possible 
to imperially test some current theoretical models about the implications of 
targeting the higher levels of the supply chain in order to drive up retail prices. 
 
Variation in Cocaine Prices: Spatial Variation  
 
 Unlike the markets for consumer goods, or security prices, illicit drug 
markets exhibit substantial price variation across location. Caulkins (1995) 
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observes that a kilogram of cocaine often sells for $6,000 more in Boston than in 
New York City. This would lead one to expect that an arbitrageur would quickly 
step in and purchase cocaine in New York City and then sell it for the high price 
in Boston (pocketing the profit) until the price difference narrowed to only the 
incurred transportation costs. However, such actions appear not to be occurring as 
the price difference between Boston and New York City has persisted for many 
years (Caulkins 1995).  
This systematic variation in prices between cities implies that there are 
poor information flows (implying that arbitrageurs would not be aware of such 
opportunities), and/or significant transactions cost associated with such lateral 
market transactions that would evaporate the opportunity for arbitrage.  
Reuter et al. (1988) analyze data on 551 wholesale transactions provided 
by the DEA’s Domestic Intelligence Unit, they find that cocaine prices were 
lowest in southern Florida and lower in New York City than they were anywhere 
except southern Florida. They hypothesis that such variation is likely the result of 
Florida being a point of entry for cocaine and that New York City allows for 
lower prices because of its large market size. Further, Caulkins and Padman 
(1993) find that prices reported by the Western States Information Network 
(WSIN) for 1984-1991 are lowest near points of import. Specifically, they find 
prices were lowest near the principle points on import (Los Angeles and the 
Mexican Border), are below average near secondary points of import (San 
Francisco and Seattle/Canadian border), and increase as one moves north. 
Caulkins and Padman (1993) also test several other illicit drugs and find evidence 
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for the existence of geographic variation as well in crack, heroin, 
methamphetamine, and modest geographic effects for cannabis products. 
 Expanding on these two previous studies, Caulkins (1993) used data from 
the Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network 
(MAGLOCLEN) to test the relation of drug prices to population density and 
locality with respect to “Tier I” cities. Caulkins (1993) finds evidence to support 
the claim that cocaine prices follow an urban hierarchy where as they are lowest at 
points of import such as New York City (a tier I city) and increase as you move 
away from the city. Caulkins (1993) also finds that, all things equal, between two 
cities with equal distance from a tier 1 city, population size and density are a 
significant determinate to price.   
 Grossman, Chalopuka, and Brown (1996) report similar evidence that 
prices subject to spatial variation based on a system of dispersion. They identify 
eight import cities for cocaine from the DEA intelligence division: New York, 
Miami, Los Angeles, Houston, San Diego, New Orleans, Dallas, and Phoenix. 
Grossman, Chalopuka, and Brown (1996) find, through regression analysis, that 
prices are lower in the eight port of entry cities than in other cities with 
differentials ranging from approximately $6 in the case of New Orleans to $38 in 
the case of Miami.  
 Continually, Kleiman (1992) provides evidence that there is even 
systematic variation in prices between neighborhoods within one city; he reports 
significant heroin prices to be consistently lower in Harlem than in the lower east 
side (which is only 30 minutes away by subway). This observation is bolstered by 
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data from the 1993 domestic monitor program that shows the mean price per pure 
milligram of heroine in east Harlem was $0.358 vs. a mean price of $0.471 per 
pure milligram on the lower east side, a difference that that is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (USDEA 1994). 
 In summary, there is extensive support that cocaine is distributed through 
an “urban hierarchy”, where as large cities tend to be “leaders” with drugs 
diffusing down through layers of successively smaller surrounding communities. 
For example, a port of entry such as New York City occupies a top spot on the 
hierarchy, followed by large cosmopolitan cities such as Philadelphia, and further 
followed by more regionally oriented cities such as Pittsburgh. This trend is 
further supported by cocaine dealer interviews in Washington D.C. who report 
receiving drugs from Los Angeles (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). This phenomenon 
contradicts the idea that drugs follow the shortest path from place of import to 
point of retail sale (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). 
 
Variation in Purity and its Effects on Prices  
 
 Caulkins and Padman (1991, 1993) and DiNardo (1993) studied the effects 
of quantity on prices and found that price is not determined by quantity alone. 
Cocaine and illicit drugs in general are frequently sold diluted and/or adulterated. 
However, because drugs are purchased for their pharmacological effect, and the 
drugs themselves are vastly more valuable than the adulterants or diluents, it 
should be expected that two grams of a drug that was 40 percent pure would cost 
about as much as one gram that was 80 percent pure (Caulkins 1994a). Indeed 
cutting cocaine is not costless - there are additional fees for labor, packaging, and 
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to buy the cutting agent. However, Carlson and Siegal (1991) claim that the 
charge for cutting cocaine powder into crack is only about 2 percent of the value 
of cocaine. Further, since criminal sanctions are based on the raw, not pure, 
quantity possessed at the time of arrest, dealers incur a modestly greater risk per 
pure gram when they sell diluted drugs (United States Sentencing Commission 
1998). Thus, these arguments imply that while doubling purity might not exactly 
double price, the price increase would be almost as great.  
 Nevertheless, the previously mentioned studies suggest that the market 
commands only a slight premium for higher purity drugs. Caulkins and Padman 
(1993), regressed transaction price on transaction size and purity, and found that 
the coefficient of purity is very small. Essentially, they showed that the market for 
cocaine values 2 grams at 40 percent purity more than 1 gram at 80 percent purity. 
These results are very counterintuitive. They suggest that either dealers are not 
maximizing profits or they are not free to adjust the purity of their product. It 
would seem that dealers could simply increase their revenues by further diluting 
their product. This would also increase their risk exposure because now they 
would need to sell more, and in turn would be more likely to be arrested, however 
it is more likely that their revenue would increase much faster than their costs (i.e. 
risk level) (Caulkins and Padman 1993).  
 Even more perplexing is the concept that purity is not a significant factor 
that determines the price a user is willing to pay. One interpretation is that drug 
users simply do not care about the purity of the drug they consume. Again, this 
can’t be true because then it would be difficult to explain why dealers don’t dilute 
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the drugs even more than is customarily done. What is perhaps more likely is that 
the expected purity, not the actual purity, along with transaction size, governs the 
price (Caulkins 1994a). This argument seems highly probable given the following 
notions. First, Caulkins (1994a) demonstrated that cocaine purity varies 
enormously from purchase to purchase even for a given transaction size in a given 
city and year. Second, drug users generally have no secure means to verify purity 
before purchase. Thus, we are lead to believe, a priori, that users are purchasing 
drugs on what they expect purity to be. Caulkins (1994a) titles this notion the 
“expected purity hypothesis”, and though the application of various regression 
models, finds evidence for it. The “expected purity hypothesis” is presented 
bellow.  
 
Analytical Framework for Developing a Price Series for Cocaine  
 In order to estimate a demand curve for cocaine it is essential to develop a 
price series for cocaine. The STRIDE data set provides observational prices for 
individual drug purchases, and therefore must be standardized by year and 
location. Caulkins (1994) demonstrates that a log-linear model, regressing price 
on quantity, fits the STRIDE data well (R² = 0.797 for gram and R² = 0.784 for 
kilogram) compared with other methods, yet it violates an underlining assumption 
that purity is a significant determinant of price. Adding pure quantity to the 
regression produces a magnitude of significance that is very small (β = 0.093 for 
gram and β = 0.055 for kilogram), leading to the conclusion that the purity 
recorded in the STRIDE data set is disjoint from the purity that determines prices. 
Caulkins (1994) surmises that such a discrepancy may arise due either to 
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measurement error or the asymmetry in information concerning purity between 
the seller and the buyer – the seller cannot credibly warrant prices and the buyer 
cannot assay purity until the transaction is completed. Caulkins (1994) tests the 
latter hypothesis by conducting the Hausman test on the following ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, where X is a 
vector of explanatory variables and Z is X augmented by the interaction between 
the dummies for location and time.  
OLS: ln(price) = β*X + β*ln(purity) + ε                               
(3) 
 
2SLS: Stage 1: ln(purity) = α*Z + ε                                        
(4) 
                                        Stage 2: ln(price) = β*X  + β*ln(purity) + ε              
(5) 
Revealing the coefficients on ln(purity) is higher with 2SLS and the differences 
are significant at the 0.001 level using the Hausman test – if no error, it would be 
expected that the regressions would produce similar coefficients. Therefore, this 
study follows the procedure for estimating a price series for cocaine outlined by 
Caulkins (1994), and replicated by Caulkins and Padman (1991, 1993), DiNardo 
(1993), Hyatt and Rhodes (1994), Rhodes and Hyatt (1992), Saffer and Chaloupka 
(1996), Grossman Chaloupka and Brown (1996), etc.  
 Let r = purity, w = weight, c = city dummies, t = time dummies, and p = 
price. First, the log of purity was regressed on the log or weight, city dummies, 
and time dummies.  
 
ln(r) = β*ln(w) + β*c + β*t + ε         
(6) 
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This regression will produce an estimated purity variable, ř, for all observations 
and addresses the problem that purchasers have imperfect information about 
purity, as discussed above. Next, the log of price was regressed on the intercept of 
the log of weight and the log of estimated purity, city dummies and time dummies 
– constraining the coefficients on weight and estimated purity in order to identify 
the model. 
ln(p) = γ*ln(w) + γ*ln(ř) + γ*c + γ*t + ε       (7) 
 
Finally, setting weight at 1 and purity at 100 percent (which causes the log of 
weight and the log of purity to equal zero) the price is given as the antilog of the 
sum of the intercept, the relevant city coefficient, and the relevant time 
coefficient.  
 
The Flow of Cocaine in to the United States 
 
The major coca leaf producing nations are Peru, Bolivia, and to a lesser 
extent Ecuador and Columbia. Coca has also been grown in other countries, but 
the plant is of lesser quality and is unsuitable for cocaine HCL production. In fact, 
there are over 200 species of coca but only 17 can be used to produce cocaine 
(Rodgers 2000). Over the past twenty years Columbia has significantly increased 
their production of coca leaf, which is grown predominately in the remote jungle 
area of the country that are run by the leftist guerrillas (Rodgers 2000). Columbia 
is currently the world’s leading grower of coca leaf. Peru was the dominate coca 
leaf producer until around 1995, after which coca production dropped by 66 
percent (Rodgers 2000). The reason for the precipitous drop in cultivation is that 
the land used to grow coca has fallen from 100 thousand hectares to 38 thousand 
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hectares, an increase in Peruvian and U.S. eradication  and anti-drug policies, and 
most importantly Peruvian farmers stopped growing the illicit crop after coca 
prices fell sharply in 1995 (Rodgers 2000). Further, Cocaine production has 
stagnated from 1990 to 2005 which has been attributed to the opposing forces of a 
gradual decline in the coca cultivation area during the late 90s and early 2000s 
while there was an increase in the average yield per hectare (Storti and Grauwe 
2007).  
Figure 4 – Andean Coca Cultivation, 1998-2005 
 
Source: Isacson 2002 
 
Figure 5 – Farm-gate Prices for Sun-Dried Coca Leafs ($ per kilo), 1990-2005 
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Source: Storti and Grauwe 2007 
 
 
After the coca leaf is cultivated it is than transformed into cocaine HCL 
(powdered cocaine). Because Columbia has the financial resources, it has 
developed into the major cocaine processing center (Dombey-Moore, Resetar, and 
Childress 1994). The three countries – Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru – produce 
most of the world’s cocaine. Once the cocaine is produced, five other countries – 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay – largely serve a transport role, 
moving the drug from production location to distribution centers in the market 
countries (Dombey-Moore, Resetar, and Childress 1994). 
 Once the cocaine is processed, approximately 90 percent of the 
documented cocaine flow events destined for the United States transited the 
Mexico-Central America corridor (which is composed of the Eastern Pacific, 
Central America, and Western Caribbean transportation vectors) (NDIC 2006). 
This percentage may be somewhat inflated because of underreporting in other 
areas, where there are fewer U.S. counterdrug assets or actionable intelligence – 
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the USDOJ estimates the cocaine flows as a function of seizures of shipments – 
nevertheless, the Mexico-Central America corridor is the predominant transit 
route for cocaine destined for the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Cocaine Import Vectors into the United States 
  
Source: NDIC 2005 
 
Moreover, the primary modes of conveyance of cocaine from Columbia to 
the Mexico-Central America corridor are go-fast boats and fishing vessels, a 
method that has not changed significantly since the 1990s despite changes in 
interdictions (NDIC 2006) -- have not changed even as interdictions, arrests of 
smugglers, and vessel seizures continue to climb. Most cocaine available in the 
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United States is transported from South America to Mexico by maritime and, to a 
lesser extent, air conveyances and then smuggled across the Southwest Border. 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Interagency Assessment of Cocaine 
Movement (IACM), thirty seven percent of the cocaine bound for the United 
States from South America initially is transported to Mexico via the eastern 
Pacific (NDIC 2005). Similarly, thirty seven percent of the cocaine available in 
the United States initially is transported from South America to Mexico via the 
western Caribbean (NDIC 2005). An additional 3 percent of the cocaine bound for 
the United States initially is transported from South America to Mexico, although 
the route to Mexico--eastern Pacific or western Caribbean--is unknown (NDIC 
2005).  
Once in Mexico, cocaine is transported to the Southwest Border by 
Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and criminal groups and 
subsequently smuggled into the United States through or between Southwest 
Border ports of entry (POEs), particularly Texas POEs (NDIC 2005).  
Approximately 22 percent of the cocaine available in the United States is 
transported from South America through the Caribbean to maritime POEs in the 
United States, particularly in southeastern states (NDIC 2006). According to the 
IACM, of the cocaine shipments that were detected departing South America 
moving toward the United States via the Caribbean, most departed South America 
on vectors that indicated transit via either Jamaica (7% of the 22%) or 
Haiti/Dominican Republic (7% of the 22%) (NDIC 2005). Cocaine shipments also 
were detected moving toward the United States on vectors that indicated transit 
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via Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands (4% of the 22%) and Aruba/Lesser Antilles 
(3% of the 22%) (NDIC 2005). An additional one percent of cocaine shipments 
were detected moving toward the United States via the Caribbean, although the 
areas through which the cocaine transited were undetermined (NDIC 2005). Most 
of the cocaine that is transported to the United States via the Caribbean corridor is 
smuggled into the country through maritime POEs in southeastern states, 
particularly maritime POEs in Florida (NDIC 2005). The principal POEs for 
cocaine transported to the continental United States via the Caribbean corridor 
include Miami, Fort Lauderdale and, to a lesser extent, New Orleans, although 
cocaine is smuggled into several other maritime POEs as well (NDIC 2005). 
Relatively little cocaine is smuggled from South America directly to 
maritime and air POEs in the continental United States. According to the IACM, 
only one percent of the cocaine detected departing South America toward the 
United States is transported directly to the continental United States via 
commercial vessels, mail services, or passengers on commercial flights (NDIC 
2005). 
The three central distribution areas for cocaine smuggled into the United 
States are the South-West with 35 percent of the cocaine inflow, the South-East 
with roughly 25 percent of the cocaine inflow, and finally the North- East with 
approximately 17.5 percent of the cocaine inflow (Dombey-Moore, Resetar, and 
Childress 1994). Powder cocaine is transported within the United States primarily 
in private and commercial vehicles but also via mail services and by couriers on 
commercial flights, buses, and trains (NDIC 2005). Crack typically is not 
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transported over long distances because of harsher legal penalties associated with 
crack possession; however, law enforcement agencies occasionally seize crack 
from private and commercial vehicles as well as from mail facilities and couriers 
at domestic airports, bus terminals, and train stations (NDIC 2005). African 
American and Hispanic gangs control most retail powder cocaine distribution 
throughout the country. 
Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, and New York are the 
cocaine Primary Market Areas because these cities have demonstrated very high 
levels of cocaine abuse and are among the largest regional- or national-level 
cocaine distribution centers (NDIC 2005). Dallas and Phoenix are national-level 
cocaine distribution centers, but cocaine abuse in these cities is significantly lower 
than in many metropolitan areas (NDIC 2005). Cocaine consumption is very high 
in Baltimore, Detroit, and Philadelphia; however, drug seizure data show 
relatively little cocaine distribution from these cities to other significant drug 
markets (NDIC 2005). 
Previous Research on Cocaine Price Elasticity 
 
Using cross-sectional data from the National Household Survey of Drug 
Abuse (NHSDA), for the years 1988, 1990, and 1999, Saffer and Chaloupka 
(1995) estimate the use price elasticity for cocaine at approximately -1.10 to -0.66. 
They also support that income has a mostly insignificant effect of cocaine 
consumption and that the price of cocaine is negative and significant. Grossman, 
Chaloupka, and Brown (1996) use data from the Monitoring the Future panel. The 
surveys were conducted on 2,400 high school seniors in 1976, and then the sample 
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was split into two groups of 1,200, with one group being resurveyed on odd 
calendar years and the other on even calendar years. They report a long-run 
unconditional price elasticity of -1.18, and a short-run price elasticity of -0.71, and 
a temporary current price elasticity of -0.42. Further, they report negative cross 
price effects that are inconsistent with non addictive behavior, and that their 
results were inconsistent with the hypothesis that cocaine consumers are myopic. 
Van Ours (1995) examines the demand for opium in Indonesia for the time period 
1923 through 1938. He uses data collected from a state monopoly that was 
established by the Dutch to reduce the criminality associated with drug 
trafficking, improve user health by guaranteeing opium with consistent quality, 
and finally to reduce opium use. He estimates a short-term price elasticity of 
opium use at -0.7 and a long run price elasticity of -1.0. Liu, Liu, and Chow 
(1999) examine the demand for opium in Taiwan from 1914 through 1942. They 
estimate a long-run elasticity of 1.22 and a short-run elasticity of approximately -
.40.  Bretteville-Jensen and Sutton (1996) studied the price responsiveness of 500 
Norwegian heroin users. The price and consumption data are self-reported. They 
estimate a price elasticity of heroin demand of -1.23. 
 
Research Method Overview 
 
One potential source of bias in previous research arises from omitted 
variables and the endogeneity of drug price. Further, previous studies have failed 
to identify exogenous events that independently impact prices, thus allowing for 
the possibility of biased elasticity estimates. However, this study will correct for 
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these problems by implementing an instrumental variable solution. This study 
instruments for drug prices through two approaches.  
The first instrument for drug prices is a geographic approach in which 
textual research has revealed a persisting disparity in prices between cities. These 
disparities are subject to the nature of drug flows into the United States, and 
contingent on where a city falls within the cocaine distribution network. The 
geographic analysis attempts to match these port of entry cities (where drug prices 
are observed to be consistently lower) with similar non-port of entry cities, in 
order to measure the effect that disparate prices have on usage.  
The second instrument for drug prices is a time series approach in which 
two exogenous events have been identified to explain distinct time series shocks 
in cocaine prices. These blips in the cocaine prices are used to measure the effects 
of exogenous price shifts on cocaine consumption. This approach measures how 
cocaine users shift their consumption when faced with an independent increase in 
short term cocaine prices.  
 
Data 
 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and Geocode File 
 
 Beginning in 1979, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics has 
conducted nationally representative surveys on a sample of 12,686 young men and 
woman. Surveys were collected annually for the years 1979 through 1994 and 
thereafter, beginning with 1996, were collected biannually.  The restricted 
NLSY79 Geocode file have been used to link respondents to their state, county, 
and metropolitan statistical area of residence. Drug related questions were asked 
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during the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1998. Initially, soldiers and civilian 
Hispanics, black and economically disadvantaged whites were oversampled in the 
NLSY. Since 1985, the military oversampling disappeared and 1643 individuals 
of the oversampled civilian population were dropped in 1991.  
The NLSY79 is an optimal data set because it provides a cross sectional 
time series of a large nationally representative sample of individuals that can be 
linked to geographic location. This is important because cocaine use, while 
persistent, still occurs at moderately low levels. 
   
System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) 
 
 Cocaine price data come from the United States Department of Justice’s 
Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) STRIDE data set. The data set includes 
acquisitions of various drugs (including cocaine) by undercover agents and 
informants of the DEA and the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia 
(MPDC). The data includes the type of drug acquired (e.g. cocaine base, cocaine 
hydrochloride, heroin), the amount acquired, the purity, the date of acquisition, 
and the city in which the drug transaction occurred. If the acquisition was a 
purchase (as opposed to a seizure,) then the data includes the price paid.  
Because of its detail, geographical coverage, and relatively long time 
period, the STRIDE data set is widely used by policy analysts to study factors that 
affect or are affected by the prices of illegal drugs. Further, the prices are 
conjectured to be fairly accurate because officers use the data to makes bids 
during negotiations with dealers – any significant aberrations in prices would lead 
to suspicion and put agents at risk.  
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STRIDE data have been used in many policy studies. Caulkins (1994) and 
Rhodes et al. (1994) used the STRIDE data set to develop a price-index series for 
illegal drugs. Saffer and Chaloupka (1995), Chaloupka et al. (1998), and 
Grossman et al. (1996) used the STRIDE data set to estimate demand functions 
for illegal drugs. DeSimone (1998) used the STRIDE data set in a study of 
whether marijuana is a gateway drug for the use of cocaine. Yuan and Caulkins 
(1998), DiNardo (1993), and Crane et al. (1997) used the STRIDE data set to 
investigate the effects of enforcement actions on the prices of illegal drugs. 
Boyum et al. (1994) used the STRIDE data set to predict future trends in heroin 
availability and use. Caulkins (1997) used the STRIDE data set to investigate the 
relative prices of crack and powder cocaine. Bach et al. (1999) used the STRIDE 
data set to investigate the relation between heroin prices and changes in the use of 
heroin by users seeking methadone treatment. Agencies of the federal government 
use the STRIDE data set to estimate quantities of illegal drugs consumed in 
America. Consumption is not measured directly, but estimates of expenditures on 
illegal drugs are available from surveys. Consumption is estimated by dividing 
expenditures by a price estimate obtained from STRIDE (National Research 
Council 1999). 
 However, despite being fairly ubiquitous with drug research, the STRIDE 
data set does present serious empirical limitations. Horowitz (2001) argues that 
the STRIDE data set is solely a record of drug acquisitions made to support 
criminal investigations and prosecutions. The decision to buy drugs is based on 
criteria that aim at serving this objective; this criterion is not necessarily the ones 
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that would be used if the objective were to develop price indexes or to support 
other economics analysis of markets for illegal drugs (Horowitz 2001). Thus, the 
behavior of prices in the STRIDE data set may be artifacts of the data acquisition 
procedure and not indicators of price variations in actual markets. Horowitz 
(2001) states the nature in which data is collected does not produce a random 
sample of one or more known populations, nor are they realizations of an 
identifiable stochastic process that can be modeled. Further, ethnographer Richard 
Curtis, who studies drug markets, reports that prices often vary systematically 
among dealers, buyers, and dealer-buyer pairs – for example, a dealer may set a 
higher price for an unfamiliar customer than for a customer he know. This 
observation means that records of purchase prices are not necessarily statistically 
independent of each other. Finally, Horowitz (2001) argues that the STRIDE data 
set for cocaine is not representative of market prices; specifically because there 
are large differences among price estimates from different subsets of STRIDE.  
 A serious current limitation to this research is that the STRIDE data set is 
currently still in clearance with the DEA. Thus, for this paper, only rough 
estimates of prices can be presently determined at the national level.  
 
The Crack Index 
 
Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, and Murphy (2005) construct an index of crack 
cocaine prevalence based on a wide range of indirect proxies such as cocaine 
arrests (FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports), cocaine-related emergency room visits 
(from Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN)), cocaine induced drug deaths per 
capita (from Mortality Detail File produced by National center for Health Stats), 
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crack mentions in the newspaper (based on LexisNexis searches), and DEA drug 
busts (from the STRIDE data set). They analyze data separately at the city level 
and at the state level; the city level analysis consists of 144 cities with population 
greater than 100,000 in 1980. Using factor analysis the authors construct a single 
measure for prevalence. They claim that the single factor is desirable because of 
its relative simplicity; a single factor substantially increases the signal-to-noise 
ratio (because each individual proxy is quite volatile), and each proxy will have an 
identical impact of a dependent variable (this avoids the problem of potentially 
overstating the role of cocaine on fluctuations in social outcomes). This data set is 
used to measure the prevalence of cocaine and cocaine usage.  
 
State Court Processing Statistics data (1990 – 2000) 
 
The State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) data set is administered by 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). Originally 
known as the National Pretrial Reporting Program, the State Court Processing 
Statistics (SCPS) program tracks felony cases filed in May of even-numbered 
years until their final disposition or until one year has elapsed from the date of 
filing. This SCPS data set presents records on felony cases filed in approximately 
40 of the Nation's 75 most populous counties. These 75 counties account for more 
than a third of the U.S. population and approximately half of all reported crimes. 
The cases from these 40 jurisdictions are weighted to represent all felony filings 
during the month of May in the 75 most populous counties. Data are collected on 
arrest charges, demographic characteristics, criminal history, pretrial release and 
detention, adjudication, and sentencing. 
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Dependent Variables 
 
 The dependent variables used in this study are dichotomous measures of 
cocaine usage from the NLSY79. The NLSY79 asked respondents the following 
two questions: “Have you ever used cocaine?” and “Have you used cocaine in the 
past 30 days?” The variables will equal one if the individual reports yes, and zero 
otherwise. These questions were not asked every year; data is available only for 
the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1998. The following two graphs present a 
summary of the number of users, from a total of 12,686, who answered yes to 
either of the questions. 
Figure 7 – Total Number of Times Ever Used Cocaine, by Year 
 
Source: NLSY79 
 
Figure 8 – Total Number of Times Used Cocaine in Past 30 Days, by Year 
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Source: NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 & Geocode: Independent Variables 
• Age: the age variable records the participant’s age for each year the survey 
is conducted. The age variable ranges from 14 in 1979 to 45 in 2002 
• Income: the income variable is the sum of income received for both 
military income and nonmilitary income by year – note that there is no 
double counting between the two specifications. For military income, the 
NLSY asks, “During [year x], how much total income did you receive 
from the military before taxes and other deductions? Please include money 
received from special pays, allowances, and bonuses.” For nonmilitary 
income, the NLSY asks “During [year x], how much did you receive from 
wages, salary, commissions, or tips from all jobs, before deductions for 
taxes or anything else.”  
• Race: the race variable is sampled at 1979 and assumed constant across 
years (i.e. assuming there were no mistakes at original sampling that were 
corrected in later years). There are two race variables: first a dichotomous 
variable that equals one if the participant self reports to be black, and zero 
otherwise. The other dichotomous race variable equals one if the 
participant self reports to be Hispanic, and zero otherwise. It is important 
to note that there is a significant sample of people who identified 
themselves as both white and Hispanic.  
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• Male: the male variable is a dichotomous variable taking the number one if 
male and zero if female. The variable is recorded in 1979, the first survey 
year.  
• SMSA: the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) are a 
measure of geographical location provided by the NLSY79 geocode data 
set. Each SMSA represents a group of counties and/or cities. The SMSA 
codes used in the NLSY79 are taken from the October 1981 issue of the 
Statistical Reporter (NLSY79 1981). 
• Urban: the urban variable is a dichotomous variable taking the value one if 
the respondent lives in an urban area and zero if the respondent lives in a 
rural area.  
Table 4 - Summary Statistics for NLSY19 Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Std Dev. 
Age 29.51962 5.690726 
Income 14645.48 111797.8 
Urban 0.759256 0.42754 
Hispanic 0.182925 0.386611 
Black 0.249879 0.432947 
Age 19-25 0.281878 0.449919 
Age 26+ 0.718122 0.449919 
Source: NLSY79 
 
Weights  
• Because of the oversampling previously discussed in the NLSY79, for 
each year a set of sampling weights were constructed. These weights 
provide the researcher with an estimate of how many individuals in the 
United States each respondent’s answers represent. The weights were used 
in every analysis involving the NLSY79 data set.  
 
Other Regressors of Interest 
• South-Census: the south-census variable is a dichotomous variable taking 
the value one if the state is within the set of states classified as south by 
the census bureau. All SMSAs which lie in a south-census state were 
assigned the value one, and zero for all other SMSAs. 
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• South-Border: the south-border variable is a dichotomous variable taking 
the value one if the state is Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, or 
Florida. All of these states lie along Mexico or the Gulf of Mexico – the 
two central vectors for drug transportation into the United States. All 
SMSAs which lie in a south-border state were assigned the value one, and 
zero for all other SMSAs. 
• Port: the port variable is a dichotomous variable taking the values one if 
the SMSA code represents Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, 
Miami, or New York and zero otherwise 
• Several city specific dichotomous variables were constructed for specific 
cities; including: New York, San Diego, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, 
Atlanta, Phoenix, Dallas, Baltimore, Detroit, and Philadelphia.  
• dummy1995: takes the value one if the year equals 1995, and zero 
otherwise.  
• dummy1990: takes the value one if the year equals 1990, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
 
Instrument for Prices: Geographic Analysis  
 
The key distribution and port of entry cities for cocaine are Atlanta, 
Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, Miami, New York, Dallas, and Phoenix. First, 
each of these cities faces a relatively lower cocaine price because of their high 
position within the drug distribution network. In particular, due to the cost of 
shipping cocaine to other cities and the increased probability of interception and 
arrest incurred during longer transportation times it is easily understood why port 
of entry cities have higher prices. Further, preliminary regression analyses by 
Grossman, Chaloupka, and Brown (1996) have empirically identified these port of 
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entry cities as having lower drug prices. These regression results are based on the 
STRIDE data set. However, for this paper, because the STRIDE data is still in 
clearance with the DEA, it is not possible to provide exact estimates for how 
much cheaper drug prices are in these port of entry cities.  
From this list of port of entry cities, a subset consisting of Phoenix, Dallas, 
Houston, Atlanta, and Miami were chosen to be matching with five other cities on 
the basis of population, population density, land area, and median income across 
several years. Only these cities were selected because the remaining port of entry 
cities are believed to be incomparable to other cities based on relative size and 
city uniqueness. The theory behind such matching is that if you can pair two 
roughly identical cities, except one faces higher drug prices, an estimate of how 
usage shifts between high and low drug price areas can be achieved. The 
following pairs were chosen completely at the discretion of the author based on 
the four characteristic: Phoenix and San Antonio, Dallas and San Diego, Houston 
and Columbus (OH), Atlanta and Albuquerque, Miami and Minneapolis. The 
tables bellow presents a summary of the characteristics used for matching and 
descriptive statistics comparing the selected port of entry cities with their 
respective matches. 
 
Table 5 – Summary of City Matching Variables  
City Land 
Area 
Pop 
’80 
Pop 
’90 
Pop 
den’80 
Pop 
den90 
Inc 
’85 
Inc 
’90 
Phoenix 419.9 789704 983403 2437 2342 14582 17919 
San Antonio 333 785880 935933 2992 2811 12474 15586 
Dallas 342.4 904078 1006877 2715 2914 16510 19870 
San Diego 324 875538 1110549 2736 3428 15095 19729 
Houston 539.9 1595138 1630553 2867 3020 15706 19456 
Columbus 190.9 573822 632910 3123 3315 13755 18264 
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Atlanta 131.8 425022 394017 3244 2990 15464 20446 
Albuquerque 132.2 331767 384736 3481 2910 N.A. N.A. 
Miami 35.6 346865 358548 10113 10072 15180 19464 
Minneapolis 57.9 370951 368383 6732 6710 16398 21418 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
  
 
Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics for Treatment and Control City Sets 
 Treatment Cities Control Cities Entire Sample 
Variables Mean Std. 
Error 
Mean Std. 
Error 
Mean Std. 
Error 
Dependent       
Ever 0.279734  0.007875  0.279476 0.01142 0.227991  0.002132 
Thirty 
Days 
0.024591  0.002922 0.015932 0.003423  0.019067 0.000685 
Controls       
Black 0.241604 0.007413 0.079438 0.006775 0.249879 0.001945 
Hispanic 0.093168 0.005691  0.064429 0.00683 0.182925 0.0022 
Male 0.51805 0.008654  0.559034 0.01244  0.503836 0.002247 
Age 29.65646 0.097508 29.63022 0.13977  29.51962  0.02557  
Income 29989.27 3634.11 25487.72 3545.925 14645.48 502.3314 
Source: NLSY79 
 
 This method presents a serious limitation to the study because of the 
discretionary method in which control cities were matched with treatment cities. 
The above table presents means for each dichotomous variable broken down by 
the treatment cities (port or distribution cities) and the control cities (matching 
cities). Two particularity troubling insights from the above table are that average 
income is higher in the treatment cities as well as the proportion of blacks and 
Hispanics.    
According to data from the 2003 National Survey of Drug Use and Health 
(NSDUH; formerly the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse) and 2003 
data from Monitoring the Future (MTF) males are more likely to use cocaine than 
females (NDIC 2005). Further, prevalence data from both the 2003 NSDUH and 
2003 MTF do not indicate significant differences in the rates of use among 
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different ethnic groups (NDIC 2005). According to 2003 NSDUH data, the rates 
of use for cocaine (both powder and crack) were much higher among persons aged 
18 to 25 (6.6%) than among those aged 12 to 17 (1.8%) or 26 or older (1.9%). 
2003 MTF data also reveal higher rates of use for cocaine among young adults 
aged 19 to 28 (6.6%) than for other user groups including eighth (2.2%), tenth 
(3.3%), and twelfth graders (4.8%) as well as college students aged 19 to 22 
(5.4%). 2003 NSDUH data also shows that rates of use for cocaine (both powder 
and crack) among persons aged 12 or older is much higher among those in large 
metropolitan areas (2.7%) than among those in completely rural areas (0.9%). 
2003 MTF data shows that past use of cocaine (both powder and crack) among 
adults aged 19 to 30 is much higher among those in a very large city (7.7%) than 
in farm or country areas (4.4%). (SAMHSA 2007). Finally, income has previously 
been studied as a determinate of drug use and found to be insignificant (Saffer and 
Chaloupka 1995).  
These trends bolster a rationale for matching based on population, 
population density, land area, and median income. Further, it assuages some of the 
concern associated with lopsided racial populations between treatment and control 
cities. However, it can be argued that there may be individual characteristics that 
cause a person to choose a treatment city over a control city that may also 
determine their likelihood to use cocaine. Future research will fix this problem by 
using propensity scoring to create matches. An analysis of individuals who moved 
in and out of port of entry cities was also conducted, however the NLSY79 
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revealed that relatively few people moved (small sample size) and at later ages 
when drug use was not significant. 
Despite differences in race and income, table 5 reveals that treatment cities 
are using drugs at a slightly higher rate (2.5%) than control cities (1.5%) over the 
past thirty days; whereas being in a treatment city has no effect on using drugs 
ever. Further, income and race are controlled for through regression analysis and 
reveal a very similar result. Regressions were run separately for the age group 19-
25 and 26 plus because of the use rate disparities between the two groups. The 
independent variables were the two dichotomous measures of drug use (ever and 
thirty days), the regressor of interest was a dummy variable for “are you a 
treatment city?” and all regressions were run with and without controls.  
Cocaine Use = α + β*(Treatment City) + β*Controls + ε                
(6) 
Regression analysis reveals that treatment cities are using drugs in the past 
thirty days at a rate of 1-3% higher than control cities – the following table 
highlights some of the results. 
Table 7 - Geographic Regression Results 
 Ever Age 19-
25 
(Model 1) 
Ever Age 19-25 
(Model 2) 
30Days Age 
19-25 
(Model 3) 
30Days Age 
19-25 
(Model 4) 
Variables Coeff. 
Std. Er. 
T-
stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Er. 
T-
stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Er. 
T-
stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Er. 
T-
stat 
Dependent         
Treatment 
City 
.033 
.053 
0.62 
079   
.058 
1.36 
.012 
.015 
0.77 
.031   
.0188 
1.66 
Controls         
Black 
  
-.19   
.035 
-5.4   
-.051    
.019 
-2.61 
Hispanic 
  
-.076   
.079 
-0.95   
-.017   
.023 
-0.76 
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Male 
  
.021   
.032 
0.65   
-.005   
.014 
-0.34 
Age 
  
.011   
.007 
1.43   
-.002   
.006 
-0.34 
Income 
  
3.76e-
08   
2.02e-
06 
0.02   
-1.42e-
06   
4.94e-
07 
-2.87 
Constant .197 
.044 
4.41 
-.046   
.193 
-0.24 
.033 
.014 
2.46 
.104    
.153 
0.68 
 
 
Instrument for Prices: Time Series Analysis  
 
 Cocaine prices have varied substantially over time. In fact, the inflation-
adjusted gram price of cocaine fell by 75% between 1981 and 1988 (ONDCP 
1997b). Further, cocaine prices have fallen by about 80% from 1980 to 2000 
(Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006). 
 Beginning in 1989 there was a sharp increase in prices that lasted only 
about 18-months (Caulkins 1994a).  On August 18, 1989 the Medellin Cartel 
assassinated the leading Columbian presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán, and 
declared “total and absolute war”, seeking to stop the potential extradition of its 
members to the United States; a policy which began in 1985 (Noblet 1989). In 
response, Columbian President Virgilio Barco Vargas declared war against the 
drug dealers and stated, “We cannot rest until we destroy the organizations 
dedicated to narcotics trafficking.” (Brooke 1989)  The state of Columbia was 
living through a severely tense time as car bombs and assassinations continued 
over the next several months. 
Further, in 1989, President George H.W. Bush appointed William Bennett 
to be the first Director of the Office of National Drug Control policy (aka Drug 
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Czar) and declares an intensified anti-drug campaign (Treaster 1990). President 
Bush and President Barco worked together on the Columbian war on drug 
trafficking, and President Bush helps provide necessary supplies (US Department 
of State Bulletin). In December of 1989, President Bush invaded Panama which 
had a reputation as a drug transshipment point between South America and the 
United States and as a center for money laundering (The Columbia Encyclopedia 
2007).   
This combination of U.S. efforts and the “war” between the Columbian 
government and the Medellin-based traffickers in 1989 led to the pronounced but 
short lived increase in cocaine prices (Caulkins and Reuter 1998). There was a 
small but identifiable increase in cocaine prices in 1995. In early 1995, the 
government of Peru implemented a shoot-down policy against trafficker aircraft. 
Since April 1995, the governments of Peru and Colombia, assisted by tracking 
data from many U.S. agencies, have successfully shot down or otherwise 
destroyed dozens of trafficker aircraft flying the so-called "air bridge" from the 
growing regions of Peru to the processing centers in Colombia (Crane et al. 1997).  
This interdiction effort lead to another short but pronounced increase in cocaine 
prices in 1995 (Crane et al. 1997; Caulkins and Reuter 1998). 
Figure 9 – U.S. Wholesale and Retail Prices of Cocaine 
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These two events that resulted in the blips in the cocaine prices in 1990 
and 1995 present an opportunity to study the effects of how usage changes in 
response to price. However, the events in 1995 present a better natural experiment 
because these events are almost entirely independent of the United States. The 
events in 1990 are not entirely exogenous because the United States played a 
significant role in the events within Columbia and also may have influenced drug 
prices through their institutional changes of drug policy – thus causing bias in the 
estimates. Further, the 1989 and 1990 events fall at the tail end of a pronounced 
downward shift in drug prices, whereas the 1995 events occur during a time 
period or relatively flat price movement. For these reasons, only the 1995 events 
will be considered in this paper. The 1990 events were tested and found to be 
particularly noisy and insignificant.  
 
First Stage 
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National price data was obtained from the above graph. Then a dummy 
variable for year 1995 and two control variables, year and year squared, were 
regressed on this national level cocaine price series. This analysis represents a first 
stage regression of determining the effect of the instrument for price, year 1995, 
on the endogenous regresser, cocaine prices.  
ln(real price) = α + β*dummy95 + β*Controls + ε                   
(7) 
Regressions were run with two different specifications: restricting the 
years to 1990 or greater and using Prais-Winsten regression analysis. Year is 
restricted to 1990 and greater because over the 1990s price is relatively flat, 
whereas during the 1980s the price drops significantly – thus avoiding the 
possibility of serial correlation. Prais-Winsten regression analysis accomplishes a 
similar goal by correcting for first order autocorrelation (AR1). All regressions are 
computed with robust variance estimators. The following tables present the first 
stage regression results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 - First Stage - dependent variable: ln(real price); year>=1990 
 Model 1 (N=9) Model 2 (N=9) Model 3 (N=9) 
Variables Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
dummy95 .202241    
.057649 
3.51 
 
.1511088    
.044881 
3.37 
1805608    
.047927 
3.77 
Controls       
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     year 
  
-.0316533   
.0120366 
-2.63 
-7.74852   
12.04174 
-0.64 
     year^2 
    
0019326   
.0030166 
0.64 
     
constant 
5.018115    
.057649 
87.05 
68.21758   
24.02506 
2.84 
7771.353   
12017.08 
.65 
 
Table 9 - First Stage - dependent variable: ln(real price); Prais-Winsten 
regressions 
 Model 1 (N=15) Model 2 (N=15) Model 3 (N=15) 
Variables Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
dummy95 .2253093   
.0262769 
8.57 
.221926   
.0221149 
10.04 
.2219235   
.0221263 
10.03 
Controls       
     year 
  
-.0720798   
.0129385 
-5.57 dropped dropped 
     year^2 
    
-.0000181   
3.26e-06 
-5.54 
     
constant 
5.416668   
.5517557 
9.82 
148.9616    
25.7384 
5.79 
77.14933   
12.91084 
5.98 
Durbin 
Watson  
1.181138  1.614381 1.613540 
 
 Regression results reveal fairly robustly that across several specifications 
and models, the effect of year 1995 on real price is about 0.2 – or the year 1995 
was associated with a 20% increase in prices. This result is further bolstered by 
the graph of national level prices where we see prices rising roughly from 148 to 
185 in the years 1994 to 1995.   
 
 
 
 
 
Reduced Form 
 
 The Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, and Murphy (2005) crack index is used as a 
single factor for the prevalence of cocaine use. The crack index amalgamates 
some of the best measures of cocaine usage and thus makes it a believable 
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measure of cocaine usage. The following graph depicts the amount of cocaine 
usage at a national level across time. 
Figure 10 – Crack Index, National Level 
 
Source: Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, and Murphy 2005 
 
 Because the crack index is a measure of usage, we expect a priori that a 
spike in cocaine prices will lead to a corresponding decrease in usage to some 
degree. We see above that the 1990 and 1995 spikes are associated with a drop in 
usage – the 1990 drop is very pronounced while the 1995 drop is very small.  
 The reduced form regression measures the effect of the instrument for 
prices, year 1995, on the dependent variable, cocaine usage as measured by the 
crack index. Thus, a dummy variable for year 1995 and two control variables, 
year and year squared, were regressed on the crack index.   
ln(crack index) = α + β*Dummy95 + β*Controls + ε            (8) 
Regressions were again run with two different specifications: restricting 
the years to 1990 or greater and using Prais-Winsten regressions. All regressions 
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are computed with robust variance estimators. The following tables present the 
reduced form regression results. 
Table 10 - Reduced Form - dependent variable: ln(crack index); year>=1990 
 Model 1 (N=9) Model 2 (N=9) Model 3 (N=9) 
Variables Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
dummy95 .0821242   
.0323005 
2.54 
.0553083   
.0225899 
2.45 
.0227558   
.0296692 
0.77 
Controls       
     year 
  
.0238363    
.005533 
4.31 
20.00638   
12.07669 
1.66 
     year^2 
    
-.0050105   
.0030275 
-1.66 
     
constant 
.1620339   
.0323005 
5.02 
-47.36466   
11.02898 
-4.29 
-19970.46   
12041.82 
-1.66 
 
Table 11 - Reduced Form - dependent variable: ln(crack index); Prais-
Winsten regressions 
 Model 1 (N=15) Model 2 (N=15) Model 3 (N=15) 
Variables Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
dummy95 .0330051   
.1761754 
0.19 
-.0081132   
.1351578 
-0.06 
-.0080449   
.1350207 
-0.06 
Controls       
     year 
  
.1901295   
.0457999 
4.15 dropped dropped 
     year^2 
    
.0000477   
.0000115 
4.13 
     
constant 
-.4698228   
.6846574 
-0.69 
-379.2508   
91.19233 
-4.16 
-189.6652   
45.71323 
-4.15 
Durbin 
Watson  
0.995507 1.134625 1.134166 
 
 The reduced form regression results are very noisy and mainly 
insignificant. However, for each regression model and specification the coefficient 
on dummy95 is very small. This result reaffirms conclusions from the graphical 
analysis of the crack index, that is, year 1995 did not have a very large effect on 
cocaine usage.  
Two-Stage Least Squares 
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 The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation regresses drug prices on 
usage (crack index) and uses a dummy for year 1995 as an instrument for drug 
price.  
ln(crack index) = α + β*ln(real price) + β*Controls + ε              (9) 
This regression shows the effect of drug prices on cocaine usage. The 
lagged crack index was used as a control variable in one of the models because 
last year's usage (i.e. crack index) may be correlated with this year's price, and so 
including it as a regressor will control for such correlation. 
Table 12 - 2SLS - dependent variable: ln(crack index) 
 Model 1 (N=14) Model 2 (N=14) Model 3 (N=14) 
Variables Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Coeff. 
Std. Error 
T-stat 
Instrumented 
Variable 
      
ln(real 
price) 
-5.60248   
3.999201 
-1.40 
-.6666123   
.3915568 
-1.70 
-.0709902   
.1181074 
-0.60 
Controls       
     year 
  
93.92305   
20.79674 
4.52 
3.562182   
16.48946 
0.22 
     year                     
squared  
  
-.0235634   
.0052217 
-4.51 
-.0008954   
.0041342 
-0.22 
lagged 
ln(crack 
index) 
    
.623738   
.2514815 
2.48 
constant 29.4911   
20.87725 
1.41 
-93589.74   
20705.85 
-4.52 
-3542.332   
16439.71 
-0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price Elasticity of Demand for Cocaine 
 
 Price elasticity of demand is simply a measure of the effect that a change 
in price has on usage. Elasticity is calculated as the percentage change in quantity 
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divided by the percentage change in price. The elasticity ratio will generate a 
negative number (because price and demand are inversely related), then taking the 
absolute value: if the ratio is greater than one demand is price elastic, if the ratio 
equals one demand is unit elastic, and if the ratio is less than one demand is price 
inelastic. In general, the higher the price elasticity the more sensitive a consumer 
is to changes in price. As before, we consider only the price blip in 1995 when 
calculating the price elasticity. 
Linear Interpolation 
 
 Price elasticity of demand can be first calculated graphically through linear 
interpolation. First, the counterfactual is computed for crack index (cocaine 
usage). The counterfactual is the linear average between the years 1994 and 1996 
– i.e. it’s the value for the crack index that would have been realized had the index 
been linear (no blip occurred) over the time period. Then the difference between 
the counterfactual and the observed 1995 value is computed. This process is 
repeated for the graph of cocaine prices as well. Then taking the ratio of the 
difference for the crack index and the difference for the prices we obtain an 
elasticity estimate.  
 Linear interpolation produces an estimate of approximately -0.05. This can 
be interpreted as: a 100% increase in prices (prices double) will cause usage to 
drop by 5%. Linear interpolation analysis reveals that cocaine users are very price 
inelastic. The mathematical steps for linear interpolation are summarized in the 
following table.  
Table 13 - Linear Interpolation Elasticity Calculations (1994-1996) 
Crack Index  
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Estimated Counterfactual 1.28853585 
Observed 1995 value  1.276546053 
Cocaine Price  
Estimated Counterfactual 4.9938225 
Observed 1995 value 5.220356 
Reduced-form (RF) effect on crack 
index 
-0.011989797 
First-stage effect on prices 0.2265335 
Ratio of RF/first-stage (elasticity) -0.05292726 
 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares Interpretation 
 
 The coefficients on ln(real price) in the two-stage least squares regression 
can be interpreted as elasticity estimates. Further, the results from linear 
interpolation were verified by running two-staged least squares estimates on a 
restricted sample for the years 1994 to 1996. 
 
Several Theories on Reconciling the Effects of Policy on Prices 
 
Perhaps the most paradoxical characteristic of cocaine prices over time is 
their consistent decline over the past twenty years, despite increasing stringency in 
the “war on drugs”. In fact, over the time period of the 1980s to the mid 1990s, 
Reuter (1997) shows that the annual cell years for cocaine offenses quintupled.  
However, to make sense of these trends we need to remember that policy is not 
the only determinate to price. We will now attempt to understand this still open-
ended question by exploring some theories already given. 
Table 3, from section V, suggests that factors other than enforcement are 
directly responsible for nearly half of the price of cocaine. Hence, it is possible for 
the overall price to decline, even as enforcement stringency increases, if the 
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declines in the other cost-components more than offset the increase in 
enforcement components. 
Reuter and Kleiman (1986), Rydell and Everingham (1994), Caulkins et 
al. (1997a), and Yuan and Caulkins (n.d.) all show empirically the lack of 
correlation between increases in federal enforcement and increases in heroin 
prices on a month-to-month basis. Further, this relationship between enforcement 
and prices can be understood non-empirically by considering the fact that crack 
and powder cocaine consistently sells for the same price per pure unit even though 
federal sanctions for crack are more stringent than for possession of a comparable 
amount of powder cocaine (Caulkins 1997c).  
Cave and Reuter (1988) suggest that import costs might decline as 
smuggles acquire experience; hence they suggest cocaine price may drop as a 
result of “learning by doing”. Therefore, smugglers may become more efficient 
over time and this drive down the import cost. 
Caulkins and Reuter (1998) suggest that labor costs might decline if the 
industry shifted to less skilled labor (e.g. from pilots to small boat crew members) 
or if there was a decline in the prevailing wage for current dealers (e.g. aging 
dealer/users whose legitimate labor force opportunities weaken as their drug-using 
careers lengthen).  
Caulkins and Reuter (1998) suggest that risk compensation for the 
physical risk of selling drugs could decline if the markets stabilize and the risk of 
being killed declined.  
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Stares (1996), Naim (2005), and Storti and Grauwe (2007) argue that 
globalization has worked in two ways to drive down prices. First, there is a 
substantial “efficiency effect” of globalization. Transportation costs have been 
reduced and the use of new information technology (IT) has allowed for dramatic 
improvements in the efficiency of drug distribution and made it possible to cut on 
the number of intermediaries. This new IT has also made the communication 
between demand and supply safer and quicker, leading to better stock 
management, and has much improved communication among dealers. In addition, 
the explosion in the size of international trade flows has made it possible to better 
conceal the transport and the distribution of drugs.  
According to Storti and Grauwe (2007), the second mechanism by which 
globalization has lowered the costs of drugs is the “risk premium effect”. 
Globalization has opened the borders of many countries with a surplus of poor and 
low skilled workers. As a result, millions of “have-nots” who have little to lose 
may have been attracted by the fantastic intermediation margins (the difference 
between retail and producer prices) provided by the drug market. This massive 
entry into the business of transporting and distributing drugs by people who are 
willing to take risks may help to explain the decline in the risk premium, and 
hence the drop in prices. The authors’ points are bolstered by the historic 
convergence in the wholesale and retail price (shown in the following two 
figures). 
 
Figure 11 – Cocaine Prices in New York, 1977-1991 
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Source: Caulkins (1994) – Developing a Price Series for Cocaine 
 
 
Figure 12 – Margins Between Retail and Wholesale Price of Cocaine 
 
Source: Storti and Grauwe (2007) - Globalization and the Price Decline of Illicit Drugs 
 
 
Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor (2006) hypothesize that because U.S. drug 
policy is targeted towards incarcerating people involved in the distribution 
process, a policy of arresting and incarcerating violent dealers may have the effect 
of reducing the equilibrium price of the drug. The authors explain that this 
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counterintuitive outcome occurs because the arrest of violent dealers reduced 
external costs borne by other dealer, with the net effect being a possible reduction 
in costs for the marginal dealer. 
Reuter (1988) argues that suppliers react to market disruptions by 
modifying their tactics and operations and thus preventing enforcement 
interventions from driving up prices. For example, cocaine smugglers shifted 
routes to Mexico as a transshipment point in response to increased interdiction in 
Florida, and shifted to maritime cocaine smuggling in response to aggressive air 
interdiction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 American drug policy over the past five decades has not only been 
punitive and expensive, but extremely inefficient. The government’s supply-side 
intervention tactics are aimed at increasing the retail price of cocaine by attacking 
cocaine supplier – yet the price of cocaine has dropped by nearly 80 percent in the 
face excessive government spending and increased drug incarcerations. 
This study provides support that cocaine is a highly inelastic product - 
which means that cocaine price increases will result in negligible affects on retail 
usage. Further, with such a low price elasticity, increases in the cocaine price may 
only cause dealers to become wealthier, because consumption will remain stable 
while prices rise. These long criticisms bolster an argument that he government 
needs to rethink the “war on drugs” by exploring other avenues in more detail, 
such as drug education, treatment, and decriminalization.  
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Table 14 - Timeline of Significant Events in American Drug Policy 
June 1971 President Richard Nixon officially declares a “war on drugs,” 
identifying drug abuse as “public enemy No. 1.” 
July 1973 President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
to coordinate the efforts of all other agencies. 
1981 The Medellin cartel rises to power. The alliance includes the 
Ochoa family, Pablo Escobar, Carlos Lehder and Jose Gonzalo 
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Rodrigues Gacha. The drug kingpins work together to 
manufacture, transport and market cocaine. The United States 
and Colombia ratify a bilateral extradition treaty.  
1982 Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel Noriega allows Pablo Escobar 
to ship cocaine through Panama. In the United States, Vice-
President Georgia H.W. Bush forms the South Florida Drug 
Task Force, Miami being the main entry point at the time. 
1984 Nancy Regan launches her “Just Say No” anti-drug campaign 
1985 Colombia extradites drug traffickers to the United States for the 
first time.  
Mid-1980s Because of the South Florida Drug Force’s work, cocaine 
trafficking slowly changes transport routes. The Mexican 
border becomes the major point of entry for cocaine headed into 
the United States. Crack, a cheap, addictive potent form of 
cocaine, is first developed in the early 1980s; it becomes 
popular in the New York Region, devastating inner-city 
neighborhoods.  
October 1986 Reagan signs the first Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which 
appropriates $1.7 billion to fight the drug war. The bill also 
creates mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses, which 
are increasingly criticized for promoting significant racial 
disparities in the prison population. 
February 1987 Carlos Lehder is captured by the Colombian National Police 
and extradited to the United States, where he’s convicted of 
drug smuggling and sentenced to life in prison without parole, 
plus an additional 135 years.  
May 1987 After receiving personal threats from drug traffickers, the 
justice on the Colombian Supreme Court rules by a vote of 13-
12 to annul the extradition treaty with the United States.  
1989 President George H.W. Bush creates the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and appoints William Bennett 
as his first "drug czar." Bennett aims to make drug abuse 
socially unacceptable. 
December 1989 The United States invades Panama. Gen. Manuel Noriega 
surrenders to the DEA on Jan. 3, 1990, in Panama and is sent to 
Miami the next day. In 1992, Noriega is convicted on eight 
counts of drug trafficking, money laundering and racketeering, 
and sentenced to 40 years in prison. 
1991 The Colombian assembly votes to ban extradition in its new 
constitution. Pablo Escobar surrenders to the Colombian police 
the same day. He is confined in a private luxury prison, though 
reports suggest that he travels in and out as he pleases. When 
Colombian authorities try to move Escobar to another prison in 
July 1992, he escapes. 
1992 Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari issues regulations 
for DEA officers in his country. The new rules limit the number 
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of agents in Mexico, deny them diplomatic immunity, prohibit 
them from carrying weapons, and designate certain cities in 
which they can live.  
November 
1993 
President Clinton signs the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which increases the amount of trade and 
traffic across the U.S.-Mexican border. This makes it more 
difficult for U.S. Customs to find narcotics moving across the 
border. 
December 1993 Pablo Escobar, in hiding since mid-1992, is found by 
Colombian police using American technology that can 
recognize his voice on a cell phone call and estimate his 
location. He tries to flee but is killed. 
August 2000 President Bill Clinton gives $1.3 billion in aid to Plan 
Colombia, an effort to decrease the amount of cocaine produced 
in that nation. The aid supports the aerial spraying of coca crops 
with toxic herbicides, and also pays for combat helicopters and 
training for the Colombian military. 
Source: NPR, the Forgotten War on Drugs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Written Summary of Capstone project 
 
Illicit drugs impose significant costs on society and on individual uses. 
These costs include increased crime, health problems, and employment. Because 
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of these costs, both the federal government and the state governments have made 
drug controls an important budget priority. Traditionally, American drug control 
policy has been focused on supply side intervention. In theory, with interdiction 
efforts focused on suppliers, the cost (i.e. the risk) of producing drugs will 
increase, a cost that will then be passed along to the final consumers. This 
increase in the retail drug prices should then in turn cause usage to drop.  
According to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
in 1995, spending on the “war on drugs” was approximately $30-35 billion 
between the federal, state, and local government. This figure represents a fivefold 
increase from the previous decades spending of $6-7 billion (ONDCP 1997). With 
drug control being such a significant factor of government spending, it becomes 
crucial for researchers to determine the efficacy of current drug policies and asses 
the validity of such large government expenses. One possible way of evaluating 
these policies is to measure the price elasticity of demand for cocaine. This 
estimate will allow researchers and policy makers to estimate the effects that an 
increase in drug prices will have on drug consumption. 
This research estimates the price elasticity for cocaine through two 
approaches. The first approach is a geographic analysis. Textual research has 
revealed a persisting disparity in prices between cities. These disparities are 
subject to the nature of drug flows into the United States, and contingent on where 
a city falls within the cocaine distribution network. The geographic analysis 
attempts to match these port of entry cities (where drug prices are observed to be 
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consistently lower) with similar non-port of entry cities, in order to measure the 
effect that disparate prices have on usage.  
The second approach is a time series analysis. Two exogenous events have 
been identified (however only one event is used) to explain distinct time series 
shocks in cocaine prices. These blips in the cocaine prices are used to measure the 
effects of exogenous price shifts on cocaine consumption. This approach measures 
how cocaine users shift their consumption when faced with an independent 
increase in short term cocaine prices. 
The geographic analysis reveals that on average, people in the port of entry 
cities are using drugs, in the past thirty days, at a rate of 1-3% higher than people 
in non-port of entry cities. The time series analysis reveals that the identified 
exogenous event worked to elevate prices by 20% for that year, however there 
was almost negligible effects on cocaine usage. 
This study estimates a short term price elasticity of 5% for cocaine. This 
means that is the price of cocaine is doubled, cocaine consumption will decrease 
by only 5%. This result raises serious policy concerns – why is the government so 
focused on driving up prices, when a price increase results in an almost negligible 
usage decrease? Further, these results bolsters an argument that the United States 
needs to reassess its strategy for fighting the “war on drugs”. By attacking 
suppliers and driving the price up, there is going to be scant effect on drug usage, 
given its significant inelasticity. Rather, public policy may be better served by 
concentrating on drug education, treatment, and decriminalization efforts.  
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